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ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM 
AND FAITH VERSUS REASON: 
A CRITIQUE OF ADAMS ON OCKHAM 
Alfred J. Freddoso 
The purpose of this essay is to take issue with two aspects of Marilyn 
Adams's monumental work William Ockham. Part I deals with Ockham's 
ontology, arguing (i) that Adams does not sufficiently appreciate the use 
Ockham makes of the principle of ontological parsimony in his attempt to 
refute the thesis that there are extramental universals or common natures and 
(ii) that she sets an implausibly high standard of success for Ockham's project 
of showing that the only singular entities are substances and qualities. Part 
II argues that Adams fails to provide a convincing defense of Ockham's 
'anti-secularist' answer to the question of how Christian thinkers should react 
to prima facie conflicts between the deliverances of faith and the deliverances 
of reason. 
Marilyn Adams's massive work William Ockham is the best comprehensive 
study of Ockham's thought ever written in English or, as far as I know, in 
any other language. 1 Without a doubt, it will be the standard secondary source 
on Ockham's philosophy and theology for a long time to come. 
Among the numerous virtues of Adams's book is its sustained (and, to my 
mind, highly successful) attempt to root out many of the now tiresome mis-
representations of Ockham 's writings which continue to be passed down from 
generation to generation by historians of philosophy, natural science, and 
theology.2 Shorn of these misinterpretations, Ockham's intellectual legacy 
turns out to be far less titillating than the wholesale subversion of Christian 
Aristotelianism that he is commonly credited with (or blamed for). Indeed, 
Adams's work makes it abundantly clear that Ockham's own ostensible 
agenda is a distinctly conservative one for an early fourteenth-century 
thinker, viz., to synthesize Aristotle's philosophy with the Catholic faith. 
Nonetheless, within the context of medieval Aristotelianism Ockham is a 
brilliant and in many ways controversial thinker, and by setting the record 
straight on just which positions Ockham actually held, Adams has cleared 
the way for genuinely fruitful historical and philosophical discussions of his 
thought. My hope is that the present essay will merit this description. 
My purpose is to take issue with Adams on two large and relatively inde-
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pendent topics, viz., Ockham's ontological reductionism (Part I) and his con-
ception of the relation between faith and reason (Part II). Section A of Part 
I is devoted to showing that Adams fails to recognize the central role played 
by the principle of ontological parsimony in Ockham's attempt to refute the 
claim that there are extra mental universals or common natures, while in 
section B I argue that she burdens Ockham with an unjustifiably high standard 
of success in his attempt to establish the thesis that the only singular entities 
are substances and qualities. In Part II I propose to show that Adams does 
not provide a convincing vindication of Ockham's answer to the question of 
how Christian philosophers ought to deal with apparent conflicts between the 
deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. My strategy here is to 
develop in some detail the striking contrast between Aquinas and Ockham 
on this important issue and to argue on that basis that any persuasive defense 
of Ockham against Aquinas must go deeper than Adams suggests. 
I. Ockham's Ontological Reductionism 
Ockham is obsessed with ontology, so much so that his singlemindedness 
at times distracts him from deeper and more pressing matters. Still, it is in 
doing ontology that he is at his philosophical best. 
As Ockham sees it, ontology is the site of the two worst blunders in phi-
losophy. The first is the postulation of extramental universals: 
Some claim that besides singular entities there are universal entities, and that 
singular entities as conceptualized are the subjects in singular propositions 
and universal entities as conceptualized are the parts of universal proposi-
tions. But this opinion, inasmuch as it claims that in addition to singular 
things there are extramental entities that exist in those things, I regard as 
altogether absurd and as destructive of Aristotle's whole philosophy, of all 
knowledge, and of all truth and reason, and [I believe] that [this opinion] is 
the worst error in philosophy-an error rejected by Aristotle in Metaphysics 
VII-and that those who hold it are incapable of knowledge. 3 
The second mistake is embodied by the assumption that distinct linguistic 
terms must signify distinct entities: 
The source of many errors in philosophy is the claim that a distinct signified 
thing always corresponds to a distinct word in such a way that there are as 
many distinct entities being signified as there are distinct names or words 
doing the signifying.4 
Ockham's reductionistic program in ontology consists of a two-phased 
assault on these twin errors. He lays the foundation for both phases by con-
tentiously insisting from the start that Aristotle's categories constitute a clas-
sification of terms and not of entities. Consequently, one cannot justifiably 
assume without argument that every term falling into one of the categories, 
i.e., every categorematic term, signifies a distinct entity. In the first phase of 
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his program Ockham argues, against the friends of extramental universals 
and common natures, that whatever exists is singular and hence not common 
or capable of being shared. The corresponding semantic thesis is that 
categorematic terms signify only singular entities. In the second phase he 
argues, against those who posit relations, points, lines, surfaces, times, posi-
tions, etc., as distinct entities that every singular entity is either a substance 
or a quality. Here the corresponding semantic thesis is that only the categories 
of substance and quality contain absolute terms; all the other categories are 
composed exclusively of connotative terms, each of which signifies, albeit 
in its own distinctive way, just substances and/or qualities. Let's look at these 
two phases a bit more closely. 
A. Phase One 
The first phase, discussed by Adams on pp. 3-141, centers on the category 
of substance and, more particularly, on the classical question of whether 
natural kind terms in this category, i.e., species and genus terms such as 
'human being' and 'animal,' signify common, as opposed to singular, entities. 
Since none of his opponents subscribes to it, Ockham feels no need to refute 
Platonic realism, according to which natural kind terms signify eternally and 
necessarily existing universal entities that are exemplified by singular sub-
stances, but do not exist in those substances.s Instead, he zeroes in on 'mod-
erate realism,' a cornerstone of which is the negative semantic thesis that 
natural kind terms, whatever else they might signify, do not at any rate signify 
singular substances as such. 
Adams recounts Ockham's criticisms of no fewer than six versions of 
moderate realism. The most straightforward among them, viz., those champi-
oned by Walter Burleigh and the early Duns Scotus, maintain that a singular 
substance, in addition to having physical constituents (matter and form or, in 
the case of a spiritual substance, form alone), also has metaphysical constit-
uents that are signified by the natural kind terms true of it. For instance, the 
matter/form composite which is Socrates has distinct metaphysical constitu-
ents answering to each of the common terms 'human being,' 'animal,' 'living 
thing,' and 'substance.' These constituents, known as common natures, are 
thought to provide a ground for metaphysical definitions and essential pred-
ications, and in this way to underwrite the possibility of scientific knowledge, 
which within an Aristotelian framework is just the knowledge of essences or 
natures.6 
Other versions of moderate realism, including those espoused by Thomas 
Aquinas and Henry of Harclay, resist precise description. They seem very 
close to Ockham's own conceptualist theory in their ontological commit-
ments, though not in what they say about the signification of natural kind 
terms.7 
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I will confine my remarks here to the two more straightforward versions. 
According to Burleigh, a natural kind term signifies a common nature that 
exists whole and entire in each singular substance of which the term is true. 
Accordingly, Socrates's humanity is numerically identical with the humanity 
of every other human being. Corresponding theses hold for each of the com-
mon natures signified by the terms 'animal,' 'living thing,' 'substance,' etc.-
thus the need for a principle of individuation that makes singular substances 
of the same species distinct from one another. What's more, each common 
nature is 'really' (Le., numerically) distinct from all the others-and this 
immediately raises the question of how the singular things constituted by 
these discrete common natures can possess the strong intrinsic unity Aristotle 
attributes to primary substances. Ockham concocts a wide array of objections, 
some of them ingenious, against Burleigh's position, but Adams believes this 
to be the one form of moderate realism that can withstand Ockham's on-
slaught (pp. 38 and 67-69). 
A bit more subtle is Scotus's early theory, according to which the common 
natures signified by the kind terms true of a given singular substance are 
entities that (i) in themselves have a unity less than numerical unity and are 
hence shareable, (ii) are 'contracted' by an individual difference (a thisness 
or haecceity) to yield the singular substance, which has full numerical unity, 
and (iii), when contracted by the individual difference, are (a) really identical 
with one another and with the individual difference and yet (b) 'formally' 
distinct from one another and from the individual difference. «iiia) is meant 
to preserve the unity of the substance.) On this theory Socrates's humanity 
is really distinct from Plato's humanity and really identical with, though 
formally distinct from, both Socrates's animality and Socrates's individual 
difference. In response, Ockham argues at length against the very possibility 
of an extra mental distinction between real entities which is merely a formal 
and not a real distinction. After thoroughly examining these arguments, 
Adams concludes that they undermine both the earlier and the later accounts 
Scotus gives of the formal distinction (pp. 46-59). 
What surprises me is that Adams not only plays down Ockham's use of the 
principle of ontological parsimony in the reductionistic program as a whole, 
but completely ignores its role here in the first phase. This principle, known 
popularly as Ockham's razor, dictates that entities are not to be multiplied 
beyond necessity. True, Ockham does not explicitly mention the principle in 
the long tract on universals and common natures in Ordinatio J.8 Yet he in 
fact employs it there as his most potent weapon against both Burleigh and 
Scotus. Or so, at least, I will now argue. 
Ockham's clearest formulation of the principle goes something like this: 
When a number n of entities (or types of entity) is sufficient to make a 
proposition p true, then it is gratuitous to posit more than n entities (or types 
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of entity) in order to account for p's truth.9 So stated, the principle constitutes 
a methodological constraint on the construction of ontological theories. The 
ontologist, on Ockham's view, aims to determine which general categories 
of being must be posited in order to render true the propositions included in 
the generally agreed upon 'data' of ontology. The entities thus posited are 
the things signified by-in technical terminology, the significata of-the 
categorematic terms occurring in those propositions. Given this conception 
of ontology, the postulation of universals or common natures is justifiable 
only if one can argue persuasively that such entities alone can adequately 
serve as the significata of the natural kind terms contained in the data prop-
ositions: 
[A universal] entity should not be posited except to preserve the essential 
predication of one thing with respect to another, or to preserve scientific 
knowledge of things and the definitions of things. These are the arguments 
suggested by Aristotle on behalf of Plato's view. 10 
Ockham's opponents seem to concur with this general understanding of the 
ontologist's task. At the very least, they contend that unless universals or 
common natures exist, there cannot be any true statements about similarity 
relations, any true essential predications, any objective metaphysical defini-
tions, any scientific knowledge about extramental reality, etc. 
Both Ockham and his interlocuters, then, presuppose that ontology is a 
theoretical or postulational, rather than a purely descriptive, enterprise. I do 
not know exactly how to characterize the difference between postulational 
and descriptivist approaches to ontology. but it is only with the help of some 
such distinction that we can understand why certain philosophers take 
Ockham's razor to be an utterly obvious methodological constraint in doing 
ontology, while others deem it just as obviously irrelevant to the task of 
delineating the most general categories of being. Numbered among the latter 
is Nicholas Wolterstorff. who maintains that ontology is "descriptive, not 
explanatory"ll and says this about Ockham's razor: 
[One] reason for the reluctance to admit that there are predicable universals 
is adherence to the popular but puzzling dictum that we ought not multiply 
entities beyond necessity. Seldom is it clear what is meant by this. What 
might sometimes be meant by it is that we ought not to say that there is or 
exists a certain entity, or that there are or exist entities of a certain sort, unless 
we find it necessary to do so. Or what might be meant is that we ought not 
to refer to entities unless we find it necessary to do so .... [But] what we wish 
to do [as ontologists] is find out whether there are predicable universals; 
whether for this or that purpose it is necessary to say that there are, or to 
refer to them, is really quite a different matter. 12 
On pp. 156-161, while discussing the second phase of Ockham's program, 
Adams expresses similar reservations about the principle and Ockham's use 
of it. 
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Be that as it may, my purpose here is not to assess or even to clarify the 
debate between postulationalists and descriptivists. I merely want to show 
how Ockham uses his razor against Scotus and Burleigh. The postulational 
conception of ontology enables us to distinguish two different kinds of argu-
ments that a conceptualist like Ockham might employ against realists. First, 
there are direct arguments, which try to establish that the various theories 
propounded by realists suffer from insuperable deficiencies. One might argue, 
as Ockham does, that the realist theories have absurd consequences or that 
they fail to save the data. As noted above, Adams judges that these direct 
arguments succeed against Scotus but not against Burleigh. However, in the 
Ordinatio discussion of universals Ockham also employs indirect arguments, 
i.e., arguments meant to show that even if the realist theories are internally 
coherent and adequate to preserve the data, those data can nonetheless be 
accommodated equally well by a coherent theory that does not posit any 
common natures at all. He argues, for example, that common natures are not 
required to undergird the truth of propositions about how substances resemble 
one another in various ways and to various degrees; similar arguments focus 
on essential predications, metaphysical definitions, and the possibility of 
scientific knowledge. 13 What follows, given the principle of parsimony, is 
that even if Ockham's direct arguments against Burleigh and Scotus fail-
indeed, even in the absence of such arguments-he still triumphs as long as 
he can show that his own more economical theory posits enough significata 
to make the data true. Ockham's indirect arguments are in fact very powerful; 
as I see it, they effectively defeat the straightforward versions of moderate 
realism. But my main point here is simply this: Ockham clearly presupposes, 
as Adams should have realized, that the principle of parsimony stands behind 
these arguments. 
Ockham's own positive account of universals repudiates the notion that sin-
gular substances have metaphysical constituents of the sort described above. 
Every real entity is singular in and of itself. So no problem of individuation is 
generated by the mere fact that kind terms apply to singular substances, and there 
is no need to posit individual differences that contract common natures to yield 
such substances. But how is it that certain mental, spoken, and written terms, 
though singular in being, are universal in signification? And what do they signify 
if not common natures? To take the second question first, Ockham replies that 
what they signify are none other than the singular entities of which they are truly 
predicable. 14 For instance, the kind term 'human being' signifies all and only the 
singular substances of which 'human being' is truly predicable, and it is a 
common or universal term because it has the capacity to signify many human 
beings in such a way that it signifies no one of them more than any other. In 
response to the first question, Ockham asserts that a mental common term has 
the capacity to signify many singulars by its very nature, whereas spoken and 
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written common terms have this capacity only because of the linguistic con-
ventions by which they are subordinated to the corresponding mental terms. 
(On pp. 121-141 Adams lays out the problems attendant upon this doctrine 
of the natural signification of mental terms.) 
So the conclusion of the first phase of Ockham's ontological program is 
that every entity is singular. The only universals are universal terms, and they 
are universal not in their being but in their signification alone. 
B. Phase Two 
Now for the second phase of the program, which Adams addresses on pp. 
143-313. Medieval Aristotelians generally hold that every singular entity is either 
(i) a substance, (ii) a part of a substance (whether an integral part or an essential 
part such as matter or form), or (iii) an accident apt by its nature to inhere in a 
substance. In the second phase, Ockham turns to accidents and tries to establish 
that the only accidents are qualities-where, as noted above, the parallel seman-
tic thesis is that all terms in the categories other than substance and quality are 
connotative rather than absolute. IS 
According to Ockham, connotative terms signify substances and qualities 
while connoting various conditions of applicability that do not in themselves 
implicate the existence of any entities besides substances and qualities. So, for 
instance, no singular entities distinct from substances or qualities serve as the 
significata of, say, relative terms such as 'mother,' 'similar to,' 'equal to,' and 
'to the left of,' or of quantitative terms such as 'seven,' 'double,' 'point,' 'line,' 
and 'surface,' or of temporal terms such as 'now,' 'yesterday,' and 'ten years 
from now,' or of action terms such as 'cause,' 'create,' and 'generate' or their 
passive counterparts. To support this contention, Ockham proceeds through the 
accidental categories one by one, employing both direct and indirect arguments 
to impugn the postulation of relations, quantities, times, positions, actions, etc., 
as distinct entities. 16 The arguments are by and large as fascinating as they are 
complicated, but in the end he invariably concludes that propositions in which 
the relevant connotative terms occur require for their truth no ontological 
furniture other than substances and qualities. 
Adams supplies a detailed analysis of Ockham's arguments concerning the 
key categories of quantity and relation. However, in assessing this second phase 
of Ockham's program (pp. 287-313) she sets a criterion for success which is too 
high both in itself and from Ockham's point of view. According to Adams, 
Ockham must show here, as he does not, (i) that the mental language-which 
Adams claims to be 'logically perspicuous' -contains no connotative terms at 
all, and hence (ii) that connotative terms are eliminable without loss from spoken 
and written language. Her claim, in other words, is that Ockham's ontological 
reductionism entails a linguistic reductionism as well, so that the second phase 
of his program succeeds only to the extent that he can provide plausible 
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translations, duly shorn of connotative terms, for all propositions in which 
such terms occur. 
To be sure, Ockham does explicitly maintain that every connotative term 
has a nominal definition that expresses its conditions of applicability, and he 
also asserts that the mental language contains no distinct synonymous terms. 
Adams makes the further assumption that a connotative term is synonymous 
with its nominal definition and infers that on Ockham's reckoning every 
spoken or written proposition involving a connotative term corresponds to a 
mental proposition that contains only the nominal definition of that term. She 
then suggests, without corroboration from any text, that nominal definitions 
themselves contain no connotative terms and concludes that Ockham at least 
"should have" held that all connotative terms are eliminable: 
Ockham maintains that all connotative terms are susceptible of nominal def-
initions .... And a development of his logic ... would conclude that all conno-
tative terms are synonymous with complexes of primitive syncategorematics 
and absolute terms that name substances or qualities. If so, Ockham should 
have ... regarded all connotative terms and hence all terms in the categories 
other than substance and quality as in principle eli minable in favor of such 
complexes. (p. 298) 
This picture, which I must confess having been attracted to in the past, now 
strikes me as essentially distorted. To begin with, it is clear beyond doubt 
that Ockham himself feels no obligation to prove that connotative terms are 
eliminable. First, when he denies that the mental language contains synony-
mous terms, he is using 'synonymous' in a very strict sense according to 
which two synonymous terms signify exactly the same things in exactly the 
same way, and there is at least some doubt about whether he holds that a 
nominal definition is synonymous in this sense with its definitum.17 Second, 
even if we grant that a connotative term and its nominal definition are syn-
onymous in this strict sense, there is absolutely no evidence for the contention 
that on Ockham's view nominal definitions never contain connotative terms. 
As a matter of fact, in the case of relative terms that mutually imply one 
another's applicability (e.g., 'parent' and 'child') he claims precisely the 
opposite. In Quodlibeta Septem VI, ques. 24, he asserts that when two relative 
names are mutual, "neither one's nominal definition can be expressed except 
through the other."18 And in another place he unambiguously-and evidently 
without embarrassment-states that each of the non-relative connotative 
terms 'quantity,' 'motion,' 'time,' 'figure,' 'density,' and 'rarity' is such that 
a relative term, and hence a connotative term, occurs in its nominal defini-
tion. 19 Third, and perhaps most striking of ali, he explicitly speaks of conno-
tative concepts (i.e., mental terms) in several places-most notably in 
Quodlibeta Septem V, ques. 25, where he explicates the distinction between 
absolute and connotative concepts. 20 
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So Ockham, in contrast to Adams, does not think that the success of the 
second phase of his program hinges on his being able to show that every 
categorematic term in the mental language is absolute and not connotative. 
Nor, it seems to me, can one argue plausibly that he should have thought 
otherwise. He clearly does believe that the truth of propositions containing 
connotative terms can be preserved without assigning any entities other than 
substances and qualities as the significata of those terms, and from this belief 
it follows that any entity signified by a connotative term is also signified by 
an absolute term in either the category of substance or the category of quality. 
But I find it exceedingly difficult to detect a nexus between this thesis and 
the claim that all connotative terms are eliminable. 
Consider a simple example. Ockham claims, plausibly, that the written 
proposition 
(1) Socrates and Plato are similar to one another in being wise, 
which contains the relative term 'similar,' is necessarily equivalent in truth 
value to the written conjunctive proposition 
(2) Socrates is wise and Plato is wise, 
whose categorematic terms obviously do not signify any entities that are not 
also signified by the terms of (1). According to Ockham and most of his 
opponents as well, the truth of (2) requires the existence of just four 
significata: two substances (Socrates and Plato) and two qualities (the wis-
dom inhering in Socrates and the wisdom inhering in Plato). But, Ockham 
maintains, if these four entities are also signified by the terms of (I), and if 
(1) and (2) are necessarily equivalent, then there is no reason to believe that 
the term 'similar' must signify two additional accidental entities, viz., a sim-
ilarity to Plato that inheres in Socrates and a similarity to Socrates that inheres 
in Plato. 
Now it seems clear that in order to make this argument, Ockham does not 
have to assert that (1) and (2) say exactly the same thing in exactly the same 
way; nor does he have to maintain that the term 'similar' signifies Socrates 
and Plato in the same way that the proper names 'Socrates' and 'Plato' do or 
in the same way that the term 'wise' does. In short, he has no reason to deny 
that (1) and (2) correspond to distinct mental propositions or that the term 
'similar' occurs in the mental language. He needs to claim only that, contrary 
to what his opponents contend, the term 'similar' signifies just substances 
and qualities, though in its own distinctive way. 
Of course, Ockham must supply stories like the one about the term 'similar' 
for at least a wide range of connotative terms. Perhaps he does not go far 
enough in discharging this duty. Still, the point of such stories is simply to 
clarify the ontological ramifications of the use of connotative terms and not 
to show that the mental language contains no such terms. This may mean that 
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the mental language fails to qualify as a 'logically perspicuous language' in 
Adams's sense. But is Ockham's project thereby rendered any less interesting 
or promising? I think not. 
II. Faith and Reason in Aquinas and Ockham 
Unlike Aquinas, Ockham never wrote anything resembling a treatise on the 
relation between faith and reason. Yet a tolerably clear picture of his thinking 
on this matter emerges from those texts in which he deals directly with topics 
in natural and revealed theology. Adams devotes a lengthy chapter (Chap. 
22, pp. 961-1010) to faith and reason, concentrating especially on the ques-
tion of how Christian thinkers should deal with prima/acie conflicts between 
the deliverances of faith and the deliverances of reason. In the end, however, 
she allows Ockham to beg the question against St. Thomas and overlooks, or 
at least mutes, fairly obvious criticisms of Ockham himself. 
Chapter 22 concludes with a debate between Ockham and his Thomistic 
critics, but here I will bypass the critics and go straight to the tract on faith 
and reason found in the opening nine chapters of St. Thomas's Summa Contra 
Gentiles. Although I agree with St. Thomas on the issue under dispute, my 
purpose here is not to defend him against Ockham, but only to grant him a 
fair hearing and to show that Adams's attempt to vindicate Ockham fails. 
A. St. Thomas on Conflicts Between Faith and Reason 
St. Thomas portrays his own project of explicating the Christian faith and 
refuting objections to it as a continuation of the 'Gentile' philosopher's quest 
for wisdom, i.e., for a systematic understanding of "the truth which is the 
origin of all truth, viz., the truth that pertains to the first principle of being 
for all things" (Chapter 1).21 This pursuit of wisdom, identified on Biblical 
grounds with the search for God and simultaneously identified with what 
Aristotle calls First Philosophy, is the "most perfect, noble, useful and joyful 
of human endeavors" (Chapter 2), mainly because the limited grasp of 'divine 
truth' possible in this life furnishes us with a foretaste of that evident and 
face-to-face knowledge of God which is, according to Christian revelation, 
the principal constituent of ultimate human fulfillment. 
Notice that philosophy, understood expansively as the endeavor to articu-
late and defend a comprehensive metaphysical vision of the world, is free to, 
indeed obliged to, draw upon every source of truth available to us as human 
beings. st. Thomas distinguishes two ways in which divine truth is made 
manifest to us, viz., through revelation and through natural reason, where the 
latter ostensibly includes every source of truth distinct from Sacred Scripture 
and the teachings of the Church. He realizes that many will balk at his 
unabashed insistence that Christian revelation counts as a legitimate source 
of truth, but since this issue does not separate him from Ockham, I will simply 
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ignore it here. st. Thomas is in any case more concerned with another ques-
tion. Mindful of the metaphysical achievements of Plato, Aristotle, and their 
philosophical progeny, he asks whether reason can serve as an alternate 
source of the truths revealed to us by God and, more specifically, whether 
reason can demonstrate such truths by arguments from evident premises. The 
answer is both yes and no: 
In those things that we profess about God there are two types of truths. For 
there are some truths about God that exceed every capacity of human reason, 
such as that God is [both] three and one. But there are other truths that natural 
reason is also capable of arriving at, such as that God exists, that there is one 
God, and others of this sort. Indeed, philosophers, led by the light of natural 
reason, have proved these truths about God demonstratively. (Chapter 3) 
Although he thus divides revealed truths into what he elsewhere calls the 
mysteries of the faith, which "exceed every capacity of human reason," and 
the preambles of the faith, which reason can at least in principle establish on 
its own, st. Thomas does not deem it foolish for us to accept the preambles 
on faith, i.e., to assent to them because we freely place our trust in God 
revealing them rather than because they have been rendered intellectually 
compelling to us by arguments from evident premises. In fact, he argues in 
Chapter 4 that because of the vicissitudes of human life, the inherent com-
plexity of the subject, and the debility of human reason, very few people 
come to the cognition of any preamble on the basis of an argument that turns 
it into an object of evident knowledge (scientia) rather than of faith (fides). 
However, accepting the preambles on faith, though wholly proper and even 
praiseworthy in our present state, is intellectually inferior to having evident 
knowledge of them.22 For, other things being equal, the more evident our 
cognition of God is, the more closely we approach true human flourishing. 
In Chapters 3-6 St. Thomas addresses several questions immediately 
prompted by this distinction between the mysteries and the preambles: Is it 
reasonable to believe that there are truths about divine matters which in 
principle exceed our natural capacities for systematic understanding? Wasn't 
it pointless for God to reveal truths that natural reason is capable of estab-
lishing on its own? Is it proper for God to demand that we accept on faith 
propositions that reason cannot even in principle attain to? Isn't it frivolous 
and intellectually irresponsible for us to assent to the mysteries of the faith? 
I will not deal directly with these questions here, since, once again, they do 
not divide st. Thomas from Ockham. 
We can begin to approach the genuine differences between Ockham and 
Aquinas by observing that the distinction between the mysteries and the 
preambles suggests a second conception of philosophy which is narrower than 
the one adumbrated above. On this conception, philosophy draws its premises 
from natural reason alone and is thereby set off from theology, which takes 
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revealed propositions as its starting points and tries, within the limits of 
human finitude, to understand them systematically. This distinction between 
philosophy and theology became pivotal in the thirteenth century when 
Aristotle's works flooded into European universities, and since then it has 
served within Catholic universities as the theoretical foundation for the sep-
aration of philosophy departments from theology departments. 
St. Thomas singles out this narrower sense of philosophy in part because 
it helps him clarify what he regards as the proper posture Christians should 
assume toward secular learning in general and secular philosophy in partic-
ular. The history of Christianity has been marked by recurrent and bitter 
disputes over this issue. From the earliest times some Christians (I will dub 
them 'anti-secularists') have denounced secular 'wisdom' as an adversary of 
Christianity. They have sternly warned fellow Christians about the pitfalls of 
syncretism, and they have acerbically asked why, if not because of an obse-
quious (and typically futile) desire to curry favor with intellectually presti-
gious unbelievers, a Christian might want to study, say, the books of Aristotle 
with the same intensity as the books of Sacred Scripture. They recall that 
when St. Paul preached in Athens, he was ridiculed by the philosophers, who 
in their pride preferred the wisdom of the world to the wisdom of God (Acts 
17:16-34). What, they ask disdainfully, has Jerusalem to do with Athens? 
Christianity is itself a philosophy or wisdom that competes with secular 
philosophies and aims to displace them. (Observe the fallback here to the 
broader conception of philosophy.) 
1 do not mean to insinuate that Ockham is a full-fledged anti-secularist. He 
does not, for instance, spurn efforts to articulate Christian doctrine with the 
help of conceptual resources borrowed from secular philosophy.23 Nor does 
he repudiate in theory the natural theologian's attempt to show that at least 
some revealed truths can be established on grounds that unbelievers as such 
should or at least can accept. 
However, as we shall see shortly, he does evince anti-secularist leanings 
on one important issue. All sides agree that because human reason stands in 
need of the illumination of faith, it is not surprising that philosophers who 
operate in ignorance of revelation often come to conclusions that are contrary 
to the faith. According to anti-secularism, however, a Christian is not obliged 
to refute such conclusions on their own terms, i.e., by appealing only to the 
deliverances of reason. Indeed, anti-secularists allege that in many cases a 
philosophical (in the narrow sense) refutation may well be impossible, given 
that human sinfulness has rendered reason unreliable. Perhaps this means that 
Christian doctrine will inevitably appear foolish in the eyes of secular phi-
losophers. So be it. The Christian's task is to emulate St. Paul, who preached 
the Gospel in its own terms and on its own terms even to the intellectually 
sophisticated Athenians. 
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It would be a mistake to suppose that St. Thomas does not feel the force 
of these considerations or that he does not recognize a grain of truth in them. 
To the contrary, he issues regular warnings of his own about the frailty of 
human reason in its postlapsarian state and about the intellect's susceptibility 
to prejudices and distortions that are induced by the affective disorders at-
tendant upon human sinfulness. Nonetheless, he maintains that the effects of 
sin do not prevent reason from functioning as an independent and inherently 
trustworthy measure.of both truth and intellectual virtue. Just as, appearances 
sometimes to the contrary, there can be no genuine conflict between the moral 
law imposed upon us by God and the standards of moral perfection intrinsic 
to human nature, so too there can be no genuine conflict between our divinely 
imposed obligation to accept revealed truths and the standards of intellectual 
perfection intrinsic to human nature. For the deliverances of faith and the 
deliverances of reason both emanate from the same mentor: 
The teacher's knowledge contains the very same thing that the teacher intro-
duces into the soul of the student-unless [the teacher] teaches deceitfully, 
which cannot be said of God. But the cognition of naturally known principles 
is implanted in us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. So 
these principles are also contained in the divine wisdom. Therefore, anything 
contrary to principles of this sort is contrary to the divine wisdom; so it cannot 
come from God. Therefore, those things that are held by faith on the basis 
of divine revelation cannot be contrary to natural cognition. (Chapter 7) 
As part of our nature we have strong inclinations to assent to certain evident 
principles. Such inclinations, instilled in us by God, are irresistible (or nearly 
so) for any human intellect that is operating normally, and they effect what 
st. Thomas calls natural cognitions. So if God required us to accept on faith 
propositions that run contrary to these natural cognitions, we would find 
ourselves in the well-nigh desperate position of being obliged to assent to 
propositions whose contraries are, under normal circumstances, irresistible 
for us (or nearly so). God would in effect be commanding us to assent to 
propositions that we cannot assent to without doing violence to ourselves as 
human beings. Accepting revealed doctrines on faith would in that case be 
the moral equivalent of ingesting mind-altering drugs that induce doubts 
about evident propositions. (This, of course, is exactly how some unbelievers 
view the situation.) St. Thomas asserts that because of God's essential verac-
ity such a predicament is metaphysically impossible: 
Our intellect is bound by conflicting considerations in such a way that it 
cannot proceed to a cognition of what is true. Therefore, if contrary cogni-
tions were instilled in us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered 
from cognizing the truth-ran effect] that cannot come from God. (Chapter 
7) 
According to St. Thomas, then, natural cognitions cannot by themselves 
lead us into error. But if this is so, then philosophical objections to Christian 
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doctrine can always in principle be shown not to follow from the evident 
deliverances of reason: 
From this it clearly follows that whatever arguments might be propounded 
against the doctrines of the faith, they do not proceed correctly from first 
principles, known per se, which are implanted in [our] nature. Thus, [such 
arguments] do not have the force of demonstration, but instead are either 
[merely] probable arguments or sophistical arguments. And so room is left 
for answering them. (Chapter 7) 
Someone might object that what St. Thomas says here, taken just by itself, 
can be used to sanction the irrational rejection of a philosophical argument 
that is overwhelmingly probable but falls short of satisfying the stringent 
requirements for being a demonstration properly speaking. However, the 
thrust of st. Thomas's remarks and his own theological methodology suggest 
the following thesis, which is not vulnerable to the objection in question: 
No philosophical argument or theory that entails a conclusion contrary to the 
faith is warranted to so high a degree as to render its philosophical compet-
itors (including its own negation) rationally unacceptable. 
A detailed explication of this thesis would have to delve deeply into the 
concepts of subjective probability and rational acceptability, but the thesis as 
it stands will be sufficient for our present purposes, since, as will become 
clear, Ockham rejects it on any plausible interpretation. 
Now while revelation enhances a Christian thinker's ability to identify false 
philosophical conclusions, it does not by itself supply a philosophical (in the 
narrow sense) justification for rejecting the arguments that lead to those 
conclusions. Only natural reason can do this. Further, the project of replying 
to such arguments on their own terms is, according to st. Thomas, a demand 
of intellectual virtue for Christians as a community (though not for each 
individual) and an integral part of the Church's mission to reach out to those 
intellectually sophisticated unbelievers who accept none of the theological 
authorities Christians typically have recourse to: 
Some of the [Gentiles], such as the Mohammedans and the pagans, do not agree 
with us on the authority of any Scripture by means of which they could be won 
over-in the way that we can argue with Jews by appealing to the Old Testament 
and with heretics by appealing to the New Testament. But [the Mohammedans 
and pagans] accept neither [the Old nor the New Testament]. Therefore, it is 
necessary to revert to natural reason, which everyone is compelled to assent 
to-although in divine matters reason is wanting. (Chapter 2) 
This last remark confirms my previous contention that St. Thomas's opti-
mism about our innate intellectual powers is tempered; he obviously believes 
that reason de facto needs the guidance of revelation to do its best. Nonethe-
less, he just as clearly accords natural reason and philosophy (in the narrow 
sense) a relative autonomy denied them by anti-secularists. Reason and faith 
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are reliable sources of truth which are independent of one another, and be-
cause of this mutual independence they stand in a dynamic relationship. The 
deliverances of faith not only disclose limits beyond which reason cannot go 
without falling into error, but also steer reason toward more adequate philo-
sophical theories and arguments, perhaps even suggesting some theories and 
arguments that would otherwise go unnoticed. But just as important, the 
deliverances of reason constrain the interpretation of the sources of revela-
tion, viz., Sacred Scripture and the teaching tradition of the Church. Thus, 
prima facie conflicts between philosophical conclusions and articles of the 
faith may in some instances call for careful analysis of doctrinal statements 
as well as of philosophical arguments. And, as the history of Christian the-
ology amply attests, there is often room for legitimate disagreement over just 
what the upshot of this mutual interaction between reason and faith is in 
particular cases. 24 Even in as unified a tradition as that associated with the 
Roman Catholic Church, official decrees that settle such disputes one way or 
another are rare, and, like court decisions, they are normally rendered on 
narrow grounds. 
B. The Ockhamistic Alternative 
Let us now return to Ockham. As regards natural theology, Ockham is 
decidedly less sanguine than his predecessors about what reason unaided by 
revelation can demonstrate in the strict sense about the existence and nature 
of God. It is demonstrable, he believes, that there is a being such that no 
being is prior to or more perfect than it, but it is not demonstrable that there 
is just one such being.2s Moreover, although there are 'probable; i.e., plau-
sible, philosophical arguments to the effect that one or another of the divine 
perfections is actually possessed by some being, unaided reason cannot dem-
onstrate in the strict sense that any being has any of these perfections. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that by contemporary standards Ockham is 
positively bullish on natural theology. Today it would be remarkable indeed 
to find a theistic philosopher who claims to have demonstrated what Ockham 
explicitly asserts to be demonstrable, viz., the existence of a being than which 
none is more perfect. Ockham is no sceptic regarding natural theology, and 
only historical shortsightedness could lead one to think otherwise. 
As I intimated above, the real chasm separating Ockham from Aquinas 
appears only when we turn to Ockham's views about how tensions between 
faith and reason are to be resolved. Several examples come immediately to 
mind, but I will focus on the doctrine of the Trinity, since Adams discusses 
it in some detail (pp. 996-1007). According to this doctrine, a singular divine 
nature with just one intellect and will is shared by three distinct divine 
persons. The tension first arises when Ockham, after arguing on philosophical 
grounds that there are no real relations and that relative terms are all merely 
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connotative, concedes that the doctrine of the Trinity entails or at least 
strongly suggests that the three divine persons are constituted by real relations 
of knowing and loving which they bear to one another. 
Given this apparent conflict between reason and faith, St. Thomas would 
maintain that the philosophical theory (call it T) leading to the conclusion 
that there are no real relations contains a 'philosophical' flaw, Le., an error 
or infelicity that can at least in principle be discovered and rectified by natural 
reason itself. In a case like this, revelation guides reason by prompting the 
reexamination of a philosophical theory that it has exposed as unsound. 
Ockham, however, does not see things this way. To be sure, T contains a 
flaw, because it yields the false general conclusion that there are no real 
relations. But it is only through revelation that we can so much as detect Ts 
falsity, and so we should not expect the flaw in T to be one that reason can 
rectify on its own. What's more, the fact that T contains this sort of flaw does 
nothing to alter its status as the only rationally acceptable account of rela-
tions. Thus, although we must reject T in all its generality, the proper course 
is to accept a modified, less general, version of T (call it 1'*) that applies to 
all and only those cases about which revelation has nothing contrary to 
say-even while we admit that there is no philosophical flaw in T and no 
philosophical justification for preferring 1'* to T. 
To relate this a bit more perspicuously to our discussion of st. Thomas, let 
us suppose that a secular philosopher invokes T to pose an objection to the 
doctrine of the Trinity. This philosopher argues that since, according to T, 
there are no real relations, the doctrine is false. 
In response, St. Thomas will maintain that the objection must emanate from 
a theory that can reasonably be impugned and rejected on philosophical (in 
the narrow sense) grounds alone. In keeping with what was said above, I take 
this to mean that T is not so highly warranted on philosophical grounds as to 
rule out its competitors as rationally unacceptable. The Christian philosopher 
is thus charged with carrying out a careful critique of T and, if possible, 
constructing a philosophical alternative to it. 
Ockham, by contrast, seems prepared to hold that T, despite entailing conclu-
sions contrary to the faith, is indeed warranted to such a degree that it renders 
its philosophical competitors unacceptable on unrevealed grounds alone. His 
response to the secular philosopher goes like this: "I know by faith that T is 
mistaken, even though we share no common ground upon which I can argue my 
case against T in a way that has some purchase on you. But because T is the only 
acceptable philosophical account of relations, I do not propose to jettison it 
entirely. Instead, I will substitute 1'* for T, so that we can agree at least on all 
those cases that divine revelation does not speak to. You might find this response 
deficient and even a bit annoying, since I have not tried to refute your objection 
directly. But in this instance such a refutation is impossible." 
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As Adams reports (pp. 999-1003), Ockham responds in like manner to the 
objection that the doctrine of the Trinity violates general laws governing the 
concept of identity. Since he believes that no philosophical account of iden-
tity which accommodates the doctrine is rationally acceptable, he simply 
replies that principles such as the transitivity and symmetry of identity, while 
they apply to all other cases, do not apply to the Trinity. For in this one 
instance, known to us only by revelation, there are three distinct things (the 
divine persons constituted by the relations), each of which is nonetheless 
identical with the one divine nature. So we know by revelation that there is 
an exception to the general principles in question, even though we have no 
philosophical warrant for countenancing this exception. In contrast, St. 
Thomas tries to show that the doctrine does not in fact breach any evident 
laws concerning identity. 
C. Adams's Defense of Ockham 
I tum now to Adams's defense of Ockham. She begins by conceding that 
on Ockham's view there can be ultimate conflicts between faith and reason: 
Authority sometimes implies ... conclusions that are contrary to reason-e.g., 
that three things are one thing, or that there are relative things really distinct 
from absolute things. Ockham always allows the claims of reason and expe-
rience to be defeated by contrary pronouncements of the Church, which 
should lead 'every thought captive' .... Church pronouncements usually re-
strict themselves to the narrowest possible subject matter. They do not stip-
ulate, for example, that whenever things are related, there is a relative thing 
or things really distinct from the relata that relates them. To admit the latter 
is, for Ockham, to take a step outside the bounds of reason. To grant the fully 
general thesis [that whenever things are related, etc.] would be to multiply 
miracles without any necessity. Ockham's method is thus to subordinate 
reason and experience to Church authority, while keeping violations of reason 
and experience to a minimum. (p. 1009) 
But even here at the beginning the issues are skewed. St. Thomas's position 
on faith and reason in no way implies that if real relations are required by 
the doctrine of the Trinity, then it must be generally true that relative terms 
signify real relations. He claims only (i) that this doctrine, even if it generates 
exceptions to otherwise general truths, cannot be shown on philosophical 
grounds to be rationally unacceptable, and thus (ii) that a Christian thinker 
should assume from the start that the correct philosophical account of rela-
tions will have the conceptual resources to accommodate this doctrine, as 
well as any exceptions it might engender, without inconsistency or incoher-
ence. To illustrate by way of another example, st. Thomas himself believes 
that in every case except for the Incarnation, an individual human nature 
composed of soul and body constitutes a substance that at the same time is 
a suppositum or ultimate subject of attributes, whereas Christ's individual 
human nature is a substance that is not a suppositum. 26 But this exception 
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coheres with st. Thomas's metaphysics because he has argued on philosoph-
ical grounds alone that it is possible for a substance not to satisfy the neces-
sary conditions for being a suppositum. In the case at hand, the issue is not 
Ockham's conviction that the doctrine of the Trinity entails exceptions to 
otherwise general truths, but rather his willingness to countenance exceptions 
that he takes to be philosophically incoherent and, in Adams's words, con-
trary to reason. Again, the issue is not his resolve to "subordinate reason and 
experience to Church authority," but rather his belief that such subordination 
sometimes involves the abdication of reason. 
Adams, however, seems simply to assume with Ockham that there can be 
ultimate conflicts between faith and reason, and then asks how a Christian 
thinker should react to them. For example, suppose that such a thinker ten-
tatively agrees with Ockham that all the philosophical theories about relations 
which cohere with the doctrine of the Trinity are themselves rationally unac-
ceptable. What then? Adams limits the choices to two, the worthier of which 
is Ockham's: 
The question is how a theologian should respond to a philosophical theory that 
accommodates doctrinal claims ... , when after careful and honest assessment he 
finds it to violate the canons of reason and experience. He can reject the theory 
while treating the doctrinal theses as exceptions-which Ockham does. Or he 
can conclude that he himself is incapable of evaluating the general theory even 
though he finds it contradictory and/or unthinkable. In preferring the former 
strategy to the latter, Ockham is expressing a certain confidence in his own ability 
to assess philosophical theories. But if this is arrogant, I would ask which of us 
is in a position to cast the first stone? (p. 10 10) 
But this obviously begs the question against St. Thomas. What we expect, 
but do not get from either Ockham or Adams, is a sustained defense of the 
thesis that ultimate conflicts between faith and reason are possible-or at 
least an attempt to rebut St. Thomas's arguments to the contrary. Those 
arguments are certainly not immune to interesting objections. For instance, 
one might argue that St. Thomas does not give sufficient weight to the epi-
stemic effects of human sinfulness-a sinfulness which, God's veracity not-
withstanding, has rendered reason untrustworthy even with respect to natural 
cognitions. Unfortunately, Adams not only fails to carry the discussion 
deeper, but also muddies the waters: 
Ockham's critics charge that his method is tantamount to theologism. For in 
allowing the philosopher to be informed by theology ... and admitting that Church 
authorities and our natural faculties sometimes lead us in opposite directions, he 
compromises the autonomy of philosophy. After reason and experience have 
reached their conclusion, he must refer to Ecclesiastical pronouncements to see 
whether and how their results must be qualified or reversed. 
Further, they charge, Ockham's philosophical mistakes led to this deplorable 
methodology. Had he the insight to see that Aquinas's positions, which harmo-
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nize faith and reason, are correct, or the humility to learn from him, Ockham 
would have strayed less far, both substantively and methodologically. 
In my opinion, there is a certain perversity in this objection. While ostensibly 
blaming Ockham for allowing his theological commitments to restrict his 
philosophical conclusions, it chides him for not regarding disharmony be-
tween a philosophical theory and Christian doctrine as a decisive indication 
of philosophical wrongheadedness. (pp. 1009-1010) 
Whatever "Ockham's critics" may say, we have seen enough to know that 
st. Thomas himself acknowledges, indeed insists, that Christian philosophers 
must be "informed by theology" and "must allow [their] theological commit-
ments to restrict [their] philosophical conclusions." (How could he claim 
otherwise, given his own practice?) Nor does he deny that there can be prima 
facie conflicts between "Church authorities and our natural faculties." These 
two concessions in themselves compromise neither the autonomy of reason 
nor the autonomy of philosophy in the narrow sense. What's more, even if 
some Thomists have, to Adams's evident chagrin, chided Ockham for his 
failure to become a Thomist, it certainly does not follow from St. Thomas's 
account of faith and reason that his own philosophical positions are the only 
ones capable of accommodating the deliverances of faith. 
What I find especially bewildering is that Adams, who throughout the rest 
of her book takes great care to point out the moot aspects of Ockham's 
thought, refrains from asking any pointed questions here. For instance, if 
Ockham concedes that certain evident principles-say, those governing the 
properties of identity-are, strictly speaking, false, then how can he justify 
his own ostensible confidence in these principles when they are employed 
outside of theological contexts? Only in the last paragraph of Chapter 22 does 
Adams even begin to come to grips with this issue: 
[Ockham] thinks that given who we are, we cannot but employ the laws of 
thought and various inductive principles as reliable guides. As Augustine 
taught, reason distinguishes us from the beasts, and God intends us to use it 
to understand the created world. Nevertheless, given who God is, we shall 
never be able to grasp Him fully thereby. When all is said and done, the 
Christian philosopher must join the rest of the Church in thanking God for 
grace to acknowledge and worship the mystery. (p. 1010) 
But this is a red herring. St. Thomas does not claim that we can ever "grasp 
God fully" or explain the mysteries of the faith in such a way as to render 
them evident. In fact, he explicitly asserts just the opposite. The relevant 
question is not whether the mysteries of the faith are in some sense beyond 
reason, but whether they are contrary to reason. And if, as Ockham professes, 
these mysteries are incompatible even with some of the most evident deliv-
erances of reason, why should a Christian regard reason as a generally reliable 
guide for understanding the created world? Why not instead adopt a Humean 
pessimism with regard to reason and simply dismiss metaphysics as an arena 
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in which, to quote the redoubtable Philo, "we know not how far we ought to 
trust our vulgar methods of reasoning?"27 In short, how can Ockhamists 
justifiably keep their limited anti-secularism from evolving into full-fledged 
anti-secularism? Adams does not say. 
Nor does she point out that Ockham's methodology runs the risk of closing 
off theological inquiry at too early a stage. Ockham seems to assume that the 
deliverances of faith are easily identifiable. The theologian simply compares 
them to the theories delivered up by philosophers and makes the requisite 
modifications in the latter. Revelation thus serves as a check on reason, but 
reason apparently cannot serve as an independent check on the interpretation 
of the sources of revelation. (After all, as Ockham sees it, faith sanctions 
propositions that reason takes to be absurd.) What's more, on Ockham's view 
reason and faith do not guide one another. Instead, reason reaches its conclu-
sions and then revelation qualifies those conclusions without initiating either 
a reexamination of the theories that led to the conclusions in the first place 
or a careful analysis of the deliverances of faith. st. Thomas's alternative 
seems not only more subtle but much more consonant with the practice of 
the best Christian theologians, himself included. 
I do not mean to imply that these criticisms are unanswerable within an 
Ockhamistic framework. I only mean to say that Adams should have ad-
dressed them forthrightly. In the final analysis, I found this the least luminous 
section of an otherwise stellar book. 
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15. Ockham does not claim that every term in the category of quality is absolute. A 
quality term is connotative if it can come to be true or cease to be true of a substance 
simply because of a spatial rearrangement of the substance's parts. So quality terms like 
'curved; 'dense; etc., are connotative, whereas terms that signify colors, habits, disposi-
tions, powers, etc., are absolute. See Summa Logicae I, chap. 55 (OP I, pp. 179-82) and 
Quodlibeta Septem VII, ques. 2 (OT IX, pp. 706-8). 
16. The accidental categories are all discussed in Summa Logicae I, chaps. 44-62 (OP 
I, pp. 132-93). Also, a tract on relations is found in Quodlibeta Septem VI, ques. 8 - VII, 
ques. 8 (OT IX, pp. 611-730), while quantity is treated at length in Quodlibeta Septem IV, 
chaps. 23-28 (OT IX, pp. 406-45) and in the Tractatus de Quantitate and the Tractatus de 
Corpore Christi (both in OT X). 
17. Ockham typically uses corresponding pairs of abstract and concrete terms-and not 
connotative terms and their nominal definitions-as paradigms of synonymous terms. He 
asserts (implausibly) that according to Aristotle kind terms in the category of substance 
and their abstract counterparts, e.g., 'animal' and 'animality,' are synonymous, since they 
signify exactly the same things in exactly the same way. See, e.g., Summa Logicae I, chap. 
7 (OP I, pp. 23-29) and Quodlibeta Septem V, ques. 11 (OTIX, pp. 523-28). On the other 
hand, there are places in which Ockham indicates that sameness of nominal definition is 
at least a necessary condition for synonymy. See, e.g., Summa Logicae III-2, chap. 14 (OP 
I, p. 529) and Quodlibeta Septem IV, ques. 7 (OT IX, p. 334). 
18. OT IX, p. 676. See also Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicalibus, chap. 2, 
§ 2 (OP II, pp. 31-32). 
19. See Expositio Super Libros Elenchorum II, chap. 16 (OP III, p. 302). 
20. OT IX, pp. 582-84. 
21. In Chapter 9 St. Thomas divides knowledge of the first principle of all being into 
three parts: (i) knowledge of God in Himself, (ii) knowledge of the procession of creatures 
from God, and (iii) knowledge of the ordering of creatures to God as an end. These topics 
define the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles. So the knowledge of God in 
the final analysis includes a knowledge of all creatures as well. 
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22. This helps explain why st. Thomas denies that one and the same person can have 
both faith (fides) and systematic knowledge (scientia) with respect to the same proposition. 
The point is sometimes rendered into English as the claim that it is impossible for anyone 
both to believe and to know the same proposition, but this is rather misleading given the 
standard use of the terms 'believe' and 'know' in contemporary epistemology. 
23. An animus against the intrusion of secular philosophy into theology characterizes 
many of the most important and influential reactionary movements in Church history, e.g., 
the fourth- and fifth-century resistance to the conciliar definitions of the doctrines of the 
Incarnation and the lHnity, at least some elements of the thirteenth-century opposition to 
Aristotle, sixteenth-century Lutheranism's call for a return to the Bible, and twentieth-
century Barthian neo-orthodoxy. 
24. I am glossing over many complications that a full account of the relation between 
faith and reason would have to deal with: How much certitude must a philosophical or 
scientific theory have before it necessitates the reformulation of a doctrinal statement that 
it appears to conflict with? And how far can such a reformulation go before it is no longer 
a reformulation but a repudiation of the doctrine in question? These problems are exacer-
bated by the fact that what reason normally yields are probabilities rather than certainties. 
St. Thomas would win too easy a victory if he only had to show that philosophical or 
scientific theories which seem to conflict with doctrine are not demonstrated in the strict 
sense. But neither should one be forced on pain of irrationality to accept the most probable 
or most popular current theory. I suspect that, as with scientific rationality, advances in 
our understanding of theological rationality will depend on close and sophisticated studies 
of concrete historical cases. 
25. See Quodlibeta Septem I, ques. 1 (OT IX, pp. 1-11). For more discussion of the 
arguments for God's existence, uniqueness, and infinity, see Scriptum in Librum Primum 
Sententiarum; Ordinatio, dist. 2, ques. 10 (OTII, pp. 337-57) and Quodlibeta Septem II, 
ques. 1 (OT IX, pp. 107-11); III, ques. I (OTIX, pp. 199-208); and VII, ques. II-IS (OT 
IX, pp. 738-79). 
26. See, e.g., SUI/wla Theologiae III, ques. 2, art. 5, ad 1. 
27. David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard Popkin (India-
napolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), p. 7. 
